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ABSTRACT 
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wage equations at relevant percentiles in a given representative year (1999), and over 
time (1994-2001). In contrast with the steep increasing pattern found in other countries, 
the flatter evolution of the Spanish gender gap hides an intriguing composition effect 
when the sample of workers is split by education. For high-educated workers, in line 
with the conventional glass ceiling hypothesis, the gap increases as we move up the 
distribution. However, for less-educated workers the gap decreases. This declining 
pattern is even more acute when we correct for selection and remains similarly shaped 
when differences in characteristics are accounted for. We label this novel fact as a floor 
pattern and argue that it can be explained by statistical discrimination exerted by 
employers in countries where less-educated women have low participation rates. Such a 
hypothesis is further confirmed when the panel structure of the ECHP is exploited. 
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1. Introduction 
      It is a widely documented fact that men earn higher wages than women (gender gap), 
even after controlling both for observable characteristics related to their productivity and 
the overall wage structure (see, e.g., Blau and Kahn, 2000). There is an extensive 
literature about this topic based on the comparison of average (log) wages. Nonetheless, 
the analysis of the gender gap at other points of the wage distribution has drawn less 
attention.1 Lately, however, there has been a growing interest in examining whether the 
gap increases throughout the distribution, in line with the so-called glass ceiling 
hypothesis.  
      In this paper, inspired by the approach in Albrecht et al. (2003) to document the 
existence of glass ceilings in Sweden, we first derive quantile measures of the gender gap 
in Spain at the end of the 1990s to next check our preferred explanation for its evolution 
using panel data. This is an interesting issue, since Spain, like some other Southern-
Mediterranean countries (e.g., Greece or Italy but not Portugal), still has a much lower 
female participation than the Nordic countries and therefore patterns of women’s 
achievements in the labour market are bound to differ markedly from those found there.2 
Indeed, the evidence we provide here supports this view: the overall gender gap is much 
less steep in Spain than in Sweden. Moreover, our most important contribution is to 
uncover an interesting a composition effect behind this pattern when the sample of 
workers is split by education.3 As we move up the wage distribution, the gender gap for 
workers with high (college/tertiary) education (henceforth, H-group) increases. On the 
contrary, for workers with less (primary/secondary) education (L-group), the gap 
decreases. Whereas the increasing pattern for the H-group mimics the previous findings 
by Albrecht et al (2003) for Sweden, the negative slope of the gap for the L-group, to the 
best of our knowledge, is a novel fact in the literature with interesting policy 
                                                 
1 Well-known examples of this type of research are Chamberlain (1994) and Buchinsky (1994, 1998a, b) 
who use quantile regressions to analyze the overall wage structure in the U.S. An application of this method 
to Spain can be found in Abadie (1997). Applications to gender wage discrimination are Fitzenberger et al. 
(2001), Newell and Reilly (2001) and Albrecht et al. (2003). As regards the latter topic in Spain, there are 
two related studies to ours. On the one hand, García et al. (2001), using the 1991 Encuesta de Conciencia, 
Biografía y Estructura de Clase, control both for the endogeneity of education and the selection of women 
into the labor market and conclude tthat  the discrimination component is higher at the top than at the 
bottom of the wage distribution. On the other, Gardeazábal and Ugidos (2005), making use of the 1995 
Encuesta de Salarios, also find that the raw gender gap increases along the distribution but, by contrast, 
estimate that the discrimination component, in relative terms, is larger at the bottom of the distribution.  
2 The Spanish female activity rate (% of population aged 15-64) in 2001 was 50.7% whereas it reached 75.7 
% in Sweden and 60.2% in the EU. By educational levels, the corresponding rates in Spain were 80.4% and 
48.0% for the women with tertiary education and less than tertiary education (84.6% and 68.3% in 
Sweden), respectively (see OECD, 2002). Indeed, the group of Spanish working women is formed by very 
heterogeneous cohorts. Since the 1980s, female participation has surged (from 33.3% in 1980 until 50.7% 
in 2001) mainly due to an increase in access to higher education and a reduction in fertility rates (see, e.g., 
Arellano and Bover, 1995).  
3 Educational attainments are treated as predetermined categories throughout the paper since our goal is not 
to estimate its returns.  
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implications. In the sequel, in order to stress its differences with the conventional glass 
ceiling pattern, we will use the catch word floor pattern to coin this new phenomenon.4 
 A preliminary illustration of these facts is provided by means of the 1999 (6th. 
wave) of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP, henceforth) for full-time 
workers.5 Figure 1a plots the gender gap (in terms of the differences of (logged) gross 
hourly wages of male and female workers) in Spain throughout the distribution, together 
with the mean gap (dashed line).6 There is a decreasing trend that becomes stable around 
the 60th percentile to then increase sharply at the higher quantiles. As expected, the gap 
at the mean differs notably from the gap at the various percentiles. This non-monotonic 
evolution contrasts with the one found for Sweden (see Figure 1b) where the raw gap 
increases by 35 percentage points from the bottom to the top of the distribution (see 
Albrecht et al. , 2003). 
[Figures 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d about here] 
Figures 1c and 1d, in turn, depict the corresponding quantile gender gaps for the 
Spanish L and H-groups. The graph for the H-group fits well with the conventional glass 
ceiling shape. In stark contrast to this shape, the gap for the L-type workers is decreasing. 
Aggregation of both types of workers therefore leads to the flatter and non-monotonic 
pattern depicted in Figure 1a.  Hence, there seems to be an intriguing educational 
composition effect that deserves greater scrutiny. Interestingly, northern and central 
European countries, such as Denmark and the U.K. (Figures 2a and 2b), exhibit 
monotonically increasing gaps for both groups, as in Sweden, while in southern European 
countries with lower female participation, like Greece and Italy (Figures 2c and 2d), the 
behavior is more irregular. Nonetheless, the gaps for the L-group in both countries 
resemble the floor pattern found for Spain.7 
[Figures 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d about here] 
                                                 
4 Indeed, a more appropriate name would be “glass ceilings at the ground floor” since it refers to gender 
pay gap at the bottom quantiles of the wage distribution. Since a “glass floor” could be wrongly interpreted 
as preventing women´ s wages from falling too low, the term floor patterns will be used in the sequel for 
the sake of brevity. Notice that it should not be confused with the “sticky floors” concept related to the 
lower wages that women receive at the top of the distribution due to the lack of alternative job offers 
relative to men (see Booth et al., 2003). In a non-competitive context where rents are shared between 
workers and firms, a higher male reservation wage could raise their wages above those of equally 
productive women.  
5 Similar patterns hold for the other ECHP waves.  
6 The compared percentiles correspond to the wage distributions of men and women separately. If we were 
to consider the position of women in the men’s distribution, it is found that 31% (5.4%) of women are in 
the bottom (top) decile. 
7 The reported gender gaps for Denmark, U.K, Greece and Italy also correspond to the 1999 wave of the 
ECHP. The Swedish gender gap is reproduced from Figure 1 of Albrecht et al. (2003) which corresponds to 
1998 with the data coming from Statistics Sweden (SSW). Activity rates by education in those countries 
can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
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Several explanations arise in order to reconcile these divergent patterns by 
educational attainments: 8 
 1. L-type women´s activity rates are still much lower in southern Mediterranean 
countries than in northern and central European countries, despite the increase in 
participation that has taken place in the former countries during the last two decades 
(see Table A1 in the Appendix). Low participation rates can lead to a non-random 
selection of women into work seriously affecting the resulting gender gap. Therefore, 
the floor pattern could be just the consequence of a pure selection phenomenon.  One 
could think of two alternative ways in which selectivity biases could operate.9 On the 
one hand, if more experienced women - typically placed, as we will argue below, at the 
middle and top of the distribution- are a positively selected group, then the floor pattern 
could be explained by this sort of selectivity. On the other, we may think of negative 
selection of women as experience and tenure increase. This would be the case if most 
women work at the beginning of their careers when they are young, but only those with 
higher economic needs remain in the labour market. This type of selection would 
exacerbate the negative slope of the gap and cannot explain the floor pattern observed 
in the data. As will be argued in section 3, our evidence supports the latter effect.  
    Hence, a plausible explanation for the floor pattern should rely on arguments 
different from selection. The one we propose relies upon statistical discrimination when 
specific training is a requirement to perform a job. The idea is that insofar as less-
educated women’s careers in these countries suffer from frequent interruptions - due to 
societal discrimination in family duties, lack of family-aid policies, or religious beliefs - 
employers may use statistical discrimination in wage-setting in order to pay a lower 
proportion of the training cost for women than for men. This phenomenon results in 
lower women´ s wages at the lower part of the distribution which typically captures 
wages paid at entry jobs. However, as their job tenure expands, the reasons behind 
statistical discrimination vanish and women´s wages will converge to men’s, conditional 
on equal productivity.  
2. H-type women, in contrast, have much higher participation rates - only slightly 
below men´ s even in Southern Mediterranean countries (see Table A1) - and are less 
likely to quit given the large human capital investment that they have undertaken. 
                                                 
8 Another possible explanation, not mentioned below, could arise from some form of unobserved 
heterogeneity affecting L-type women in relation to their male counterparts (see more about this in section 
5). Further, the OECD (2002) warns about the possibility of having measurement errors in the survey 
stemming from the fact that the interviewed persons provide direct information about their own wages, 
rather than their employers, as is the case with matched employer-employee data. If those earning more, 
mainly men, have a larger propensity to understate their wages, the gap for the higher quantiles would be 
underestimated. Although this argument could imply a downward bias of the gap at the top of the 
distribution for both groups of workers, it cannot explain the pattern found at the bottom of the distribution 
for the L-group.  
9 In either case, selectivity bias affects the mean gender gap in Southern-Mediterranean countries; cf. 
Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2005. The important issue is, however, how it affects the slope of the gap 
throughout the wage distribution. 
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Therefore, neither selection nor our proposed explanation for the floor pattern is bound to 
apply in this case.  In line with their presumed higher commitment, their wages will be 
similar to men’s at their entry jobs. As we move up, however, women’s wages may fall 
below men’s if the traditional glass ceiling phenomenon holds, for which several 
explanations have been proposed in the literature. 10  
To the extent that the glass ceiling phenomenon is well documented elsewhere, we 
will focus in the rest of the paper on what constitutes a novel fact in this literature, 
namely the floor pattern for countries with low participation rates of L-type women. 
Spanish data is used to evaluate our interpretation.11 
Some preliminary evidence on the plausibility of our proposed explanation can be 
drawn from a recent survey carried out by the Spanish Ministry of Labour (MTAS) on the 
performance of working women in Spain (Instituto de la Mujer, 2005). In particular, the 
report yields information about the relationship between voluntary quits and educational 
attainments across genders. Based on a stratified sample of 4.000 individuals aged 16-65 
from the Spanish Labour Force (EPA) in 2003, it is reported that the proportion of quits 
(of at least one year) among L-type women is 31.7% whereas the corresponding rate for 
L-type men is 14.4%. By contrast, the quit rates for H-type workers are 13.3% and 8% 
respectively. Thus, the low participation rate for L-type women relative to men ´s seems 
to be positively correlated with their propensity to quit. This correlation seemingly 
supports employers´ beliefs about women exiting employment faster than men and 
reinforces statistical discrimination as an equilibrium phenomenon.  
Since the gender gap displayed in Figure 1d could be attributed to a lower 
productivity of women or to a lower market return for given characteristics, it is 
important to disentangle these two components. To do so, we follow two alternative 
econometric approaches: one using quantile regressions (QR) - controlling for selection – 
in cross-sectional data for a given representative year (1999, for comparison with 
Albrecht et al. ´s (2003) results, and another using panel data based on the eight available 
waves (1994-2001) of the ECHP to control for unobserved heterogeneity.12 With both 
                                                 
10  For example, Polachek (1981) predicts that women choose occupations where the cost of career 
interruptions is low. The existence of occupational segregation by gender would support this argument; cf. 
Dolado et al. (2004). Another explanation relies upon the fact that women have a lower probability to be 
promoted to jobs with higher responsibilities even in the case where they have both the same ability 
distribution than men. The model by Lazear and Rosen (1990) confers a higher productivity in the 
household to women, an assumption that makes employers reluctant to invest in their training on an equal 
basis with men. Hence, only the more productive women would be promoted. Finally, as mentioned earlier, 
the interpretation of the “sticky floors” model by Booth et al. (2003) relies upon men receiving a larger 
number of alternative offers.    
11 Details of the H-group sample and empirical analysis on the glass ceiling phenomenon using QR 
methods can be found in an earlier working-paper version of this work; cf. de la Rica et al. (2005).  
12 Given the cross-sectional nature of the data in the first approach, the interpretation of results in terms of 
our proposed explanation requires the underlying assumption - for which we provide some supporting 
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approaches we find that longer female tenure is disproportionately rewarded vis-á-vis 
men´s in the L-group, consistent with our statistical discrimination hypothesis whereby, 
as job tenure of L-type women expands, the gap in favour of equally productive men gets 
eroded.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we motivate our 
analysis by offering a simple theoretical model that is consistent with our statistical 
discrimination explanation of the floor pattern pertaining to the L-group. Section 3 is 
devoted to describing the QR econometric methodology, the data employed, the effects of 
selectivity corrections and the results of the gender regressions. In Section 4 we perform 
the QR gender gap decomposition. Section 5 exploits the panel dimension of the ECHP to 
provide further support to our statistical discrimination hypothesis. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. An Appendix offers a detailed description of the data.  
2.  A model of statistical discrimination for the floor pattern  
     To account for the presence of floors in the quantile evolution of the gender gap for 
the L-group, we use a simple model motivated by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) ´s 
analysis of the financing of training in frictional labour markets, adapted to our 
framework where no search frictions are present but where exogenous disutility shocks 
are allowed to induce quits. 
Let us assume that L-type workers of both genders live for two periods and are 
endowed with the same ability which, for simplicity, is normalized to 1. It is also 
assumed that workers need to get specific training to perform a job. Thus, the need to 
consider two periods:  period 1, where workers get trained and period 2, where workers 
produce. The amount of training, τ, is decided by the firms which hire the workers.  
In the initial period, workers receive the training and do not produce. However, they 
receive an initial wage, W1, to cover workers´ living expenses.  Provision of training 
implies that firms bear a linear investment cost, c(τ)= τ,  and that workers produce a 
quantity of output in period 2 according equal to a (τ ), which is a concave function given 
by a (τ )= β τα/2 with 0<α<1, so that a ´(.)>0 and a ´´(.)<0. In the second period, workers 
receive a disutility shock, ω, which may force them to quit the job (say, for family 
duties). The ω shock is an i.i.d.  random variable with c.d.f. F(ω) which is revealed to the 
worker after the wage in the second period, W2 , has been set by the firm.  Thus, workers 
will always get trained in period 1 and will produce in period 2 as long as W2 - ω ≥ 0. 
Further, we assume that there is free entry of firms in the market. 
The key difference between men and women is that the c.d.f. for men, Fm(ω), is 
stochastically dominated by the c.d.f. for women Ff(ω), namely Fm(ω) > Ff(ω) for ω > 0. 
This assumption captures the fact that women are more likely to be affected by the shock 
than men, perhaps because they have higher outside opportunities at home production or 
                                                                                                                                                 
evidence in section 3 - that age/experience and tenure increase as we move up the distribution, so that lower 
quantiles are likely to reflect wages at initial stages of workers´ careers while higher quantiles correspond 
to wages at later stages. However, this assumption is not needed in the second approach where we can 
follow individuals in their jobs over time. 
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by societal discrimination. To simplify the algebra, and without loss of generality in 
terms of the qualitative results, we will assume that dF(.) are uniform distributions, such 
that the density functions verify:  fm(ω) = U [0, εm] and Ff(ω) = U[0, εf ], with εf > εm. 
To solve for both wages and the amount of training, we proceed backwards in time. 
Under the assumptions that the wage in period 2, W2i (i=f, m), is offered before ω is 
realized, firms will choose W2i in order to maximize expected profits in period 2, Π2i( iτ ), 
namely   
 ( ) ( ) [ ] ,,,)(1max)(max 222
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whereby the first-order condition (f.o.c.) w.r.t. W2i implies that the wage paid in 
equilibrium to male and female workers are W2m* = 2/)( *ma τ and W2f*= = 2/)( * fa τ , 
respectively, where i*τ , i=m, f are the optimal amounts of training for each gender also 
chosen by the firm in period 1.13  By replacing W2i* in the bracketed term in (1), notice 
that the firm ´s profits in period 2 (Π*2i) when hiring men and women are given by Π*2m 
= mma ετ 4/)( *2 and Π*2f = ffa ετ 4/)( *2 .  
     Denoting by (Π12i) the sum of profits in both periods, i.e., i12*Π  = i2*Π  - i*τ  -
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τ the f.o.c. of i12*Π  w.r.t. to τ, implies that i*τ  satisfies the 
condition ).´(2/)(12/)( ***2 iiii aaa ττετ =  Using the functional form a (τ)=βτα/2, it is 
straightforward to obtain that i*τ = )1/(12 )4/( αεαβ −i and W2i*= )1(2/2 )4/)(2/( ααεαββ −i . 
Notice that f*τ < m*τ  if and only if fε > mε . Thus, women receive less training than men 
given their higher quit probability. Then, by defining the (logged) gender wage gap in 
period 2 as GW2 = (lnW2m* - lnW2f*), it follows that GW2 is positive and equals 
)1(2/)ln(ln αεεα −− mf >0.   
      Next, having chosen W2i* and i*τ  , free entry of firms in the market implies that firms 
choose the wages in period 1, W1i*, so as to equate overall profits in both periods (Π12i) 
to zero, that is  
                    i12*Π  = i2*Π  - i*τ  -  0,  
12
)( *
1
*
*2
1
* =−−= ii
i
i
i W
aW τε
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  which yields, 
                                                 
13 This is just the average of the worker s productivity´ and the outside wage which is assumed to be zero.  
The weight ½ in the average is due to the choice of the uniform distribution in the illustration. Alternative 
distributions will give rise to a weighted average with unequal weights.   
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Given the higher female quit probability, the (logged) gender wage gap in period 1, GW1 
= (lnW1m* - lnW1f*) is also positive and equals )1/()ln(ln αεε −− mf >0.14 Finally, 
comparing GW1 and GW2, the following result holds. 
Proposition: The gender wage gap in period 1 is larger than in period 2, i.e., GW1- 
GW2.=[(2-α )/2(1- α )] )ln(ln mf εε − >0. 
          The intuition for this proposition is quite simple. Since the disutility shock is not 
known at the time when W2i is offered, the best that firms can do is to match this outside 
offer by setting a wage equal to a fraction of the observed productivity )( *ia τ  which, 
under a uniform distribution, equals )( *ia τ /2. Hence, firms will obtain a surplus equal to 
Π*2i= )( *ia τ - W2*= )( *ia τ /2 in period 2. Since expected profits in period 2 are higher 
with the more-stable male workers than with the less- stable female workers (because 
)()( ** fm aa ττ > ) firms pay a higher wage to men than to women in the initial period, 
despite having the same productivity. This explains (i) why women receive a lower wage 
in period 1 than men, and (ii) why the gender gap in period 1 is larger than in period 2. 
Which are the empirical implications of these results?  Given that entry jobs for L-
type workers typically have wages located at the lower part of the distribution, the 
previous results suggest that for this type of workers the gender gap is higher at the 
bottom than at the top of the distribution, leading to the floor pattern. Moreover, at entry 
jobs (period 1 in the model), L-type women are statistically discriminated against L-type 
men. However, as women remain in the firm (i.e., they have longer tenure), employers´ 
statistical discrimination of women decreases. Thus, they offset their former 
discriminatory behavior by increasing stable-women´s rewards relative to men´s, for 
equal productive characteristics. 15  
                                                 
14  Notice that for H-type workers εm = εf and, hence, the wage gap in periods 1 and 2 is zero. Thus, the 
glass ceiling pattern for this type of workers has to be explained by some other theories like those discussed 
in footnote 10 that we do not deal with in this paper.  
15 This explanation somewhat mimics the standard one available in the literature about statistical 
discrimination, concerning the employers´ private learning process about workers´ ability. As the employer 
learns more about the worker through a longer tenure in the job, the return on education (the signal) 
decreases while the return on experience/tenure increases (see, e.g., Farber and Gibbons, 1996).   
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3. Quantile regressions: Methodology, Data and Results 
3.1 Methodology (QR)  
Following Koenker and Bassett (1978) and Buchinsky (1998a), the model of QR in a 
(log) wage-equation setting can be described as follows. Let (wi, xi) be a random sample, 
where wi denotes the (log) hourly gross wage of individual i, xi is a vector K ×1 of 
regressors, and Qθ(wi|xi) is the conditional θth quantile of the distribution of wi given xi. 
Then, under the assumption of a linear specification, the model can be defined as 
 wi = xi’βθ + uθi , Qθ(wi|xi) = xi’βθ  (4) 
where the distribution of the error term uθi, Fuθ(·), is left unspecified, just assuming that 
uθi satisfies Qθ(uθi|xi) = 0. The estimated vector of QR coefficients,   θβ
∧
, is interpreted as 
the marginal change in the conditional quantile θ due to a marginal change in the 
corresponding element of the vector of coefficients on x, and can be obtained using the 
optimization techniques described in Koenker and Bassett (1982). 
     Buchinsky (1998b) has extended model (4) to account for selectivity bias. As is 
conventional in standard parametric selectivity correction at the mean, two different 
wages ought to be considered: (i) a reservation wage, wRi, which depends linearly on a 
vector of characteristics zi , and (ii) a wage offer, w*i , which also depends linearly on a 
vector xi , such that zi contains at leat a continuous variable that is not included in xi. 
Since the wage offer is only observed for the individuals for whom  w*i > wRi , we have 
that wi =Dw*i where D is the usual indicator function I(w*i>wRi ).  Under mild conditions 
discussed in Buchinsky (1998b), the probability of working P(w*i > wRi /zi) is a function 
of a known index gi (=zi’γ), and the observed wage equation  becomes 
                                    wi = xi’βθ +hθ(gi)+εθi ,     Qθ(εθi /xi, D=1) = 0,                           (5) 
where hθ(gi) is approximated by a power series expansion of the inverse of the Mill´s 
ratio. To make estimation of (5) feasible, the unknown coefficients γ are replaced by their 
estimates obtained from a first-stage minimization of the squared distance between Di and 
a (non-parametric) kernel of the conditional expectation E(Di /zi, γ). 16  
3.2 Data and Results 
The data are drawn from the 1999 (6th. wave) of the ECHP which provides information 
in a harmonized format for the EU countries on earnings, employment, and many other 
socio-demographic variables. The information is obtained from surveys to a fixed panel 
of households (70,000 in the EU and around 7,000 in Spain) since 1994. Our sample is 
restricted to full-time employed L-type workers aged 16-64, excluding self-employed, 
full-time students and those in the military service, leading to 1,585 men and 726 women. 
Appendix A contains a detailed description of the variables used in the regressions while 
                                                 
16 In the estimation reported in section 3.2, the non-parametric kernel is a truncated normal and two terms 
are used in the power series expansion. 
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Table 1 offers summary descriptive statistics of the sample.17  Furthermore, descriptive 
statistics for non-participating women in the L-group are also reported in the last two 
columns of this Table since they will be used to correct for non-random selection. As can 
be observed, L-type male workers are much more experienced than women (4 years) - 
where the precise definition of experience is given below- they have a longer tenure (1.8 
years) and are older (1.7 years). Women have a larger share in firms with less than 20 
employees and work more often in the public sector. The mean gender gap is around 
23%. As regards non-working women, they are older (2.2 years) than working women, a 
larger fraction has young children and their non-labour household income is larger.  This 
last feature may point out to higher economic needs of working women.  
     The first two rows in Table 2 present the evolution of experience and tenure 
throughout the main quantiles, confirming that they both increase monotonically as we 
move up the distribution. When comparing the 10th and 90th quantiles, experience and 
tenure increase by 32 and 20 years, respectively.  Thus, to motivate the results in this 
section, our underlying assumption about the link between the quantiles of wages and 
stages in a worker´ s job career, seems plausible for this dataset. The third row also 
reports the fraction of temporary contracts across quantiles. It shows that, despite a 
declining pattern, the difference in tenure for workers above and below the median 
cannot be solely explained by the former group holding a permanent contract and the 
latter a temporary one.18.  
                                               [Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
We have estimated QR equations (reported at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
quantiles) where the (log. of) gross hourly wage is regressed on different subsets of 
covariates. Heteroskedastic-robust estimation at the conditional mean has also been 
undertaken for comparative purposes. As is conventional in mincerian wage equations, 
the controls in each of the two educational groups are:  experience and its square, 
experience interacted with age of children, tenure in the current job, marital status, age of 
children and secondary education. At this stage, it is important to notice that actual work 
experience is not available in the ECHP. Instead, the best we can do with the available 
data is to use a measure of potential experience computed as the current age of an 
individual minus the age at which he/she started his/her first job which is a better proxy 
                                                 
17 Descriptive statistics for non-working men in the L-group are not reported since their participation rate is 
high (see Table A1). Moreover, attempts to correct for self-selection proved inconsequential: the selectivity 
term was highly insignificant and the remaining coefficients on observable characteristics hardly changed 
relative to the uncorrected regressions. 
18 We are grateful to a referee for raising the issue of whether the relationship between low tenure and 
holding a temporary contract could affect the validity of our statistical discrimination explanation. We think 
that this is not the case for at least four reasons. First, because we control for type of contract in the wage 
regressions. Secondly, because an interaction term between tenure and type of contract never proved to be 
significant. Thirdly because, since 1997, temporary contracts with a maximum fixed-duration of 3 years 
were abolished; c.f. Dolado et al. (2002). And, finally, as will be discussed below, because the 
counterfactual decompositions performed in section 4 indicates than temporary contracts play a much 
smaller role than tenure in explaining the gender gap.      
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for true women´s experience than the standard age minus years of school minus 6. To 
further improve the measurement of true experience, following Buchinsky (1998b), our 
definition of potential experience is interacted with a dummy of dependent children aged 
below 16, assuming that the main alternative use of working time is child rearing. To 
account for the demand side of the labour market, regional dummies and size of 
municipality have also been included. Further controls are firm size, immigrant condition, 
type of contract (permanent or temporary), sector (private or public), supervisory role and 
15 occupational dummies. The latter, also used in Albrecht et al. (2003), are arguably 
endogenous, yet they are useful in explaining the gender gap from an ”accounting 
exercise” viewpoint, as these authors point out .19         
     As a preliminary check, we started the analysis by running a pooled OLS regression at 
the mean and pooled quantile regressions at the above-mentioned quantiles for the joint 
sample of male and female workers. A (female) gender dummy captures the extent to 
which the gap remains unexplained after controlling for individual differences in the 
observed characteristics with returns restricted to be the same for both genders. Although 
the results of this pooled estimation are not shown to save space, it is important to report 
that the intercept for the gender dummy turned out to be always negative and significant, 
decreasing in absolute value as we move up the distribution. However, these results are 
only tentative since the null hypothesis of equal coefficients on the covariates for both 
genders is rejected with a p-value of 0.006. Thus, separate estimations for each gender are 
needed. 
Next, in order to control for non-random selection of workers, we estimate separate 
QR with the Buchinsky correction described in section 3.1. Given that non-random 
selection is only significantly different from zero for women, we do not report the results 
for the participation equation for men. The results of estimating this equation for L-type 
women are presented in Table 3a. The dependent variable equals 1 if working and 0 
otherwise  and the independent variables are age, number of children, age of children, age 
of parents living at home, marital status, being immigrant and total household non-labour 
income. For comparative purposes, the first column reports the coefficient from a probit 
estimation while the second column reports the estimates from the single-index model.20 
Results indicate that older women tend to participate less, as is the case of having larger 
household non-labour income, having old parents at home or being married. By contrast, 
having completed a secondary degree or being immigrant increases the probability of 
working.  
[Table 3a about here] 
     Tables 3b (men) and 3c (women) report the separate QR. We first present selection-
corrected QRs for women, and uncorrected QRs for men.  Further, to check the effects of 
                                                 
19 Unfortunately, the ECHP does not provide information on parents’ education or occupation, which could 
provide appropriate instruments to correct for endogeneity. 
20 As explained in Buchinsky (1998b, pg.7), the constant and the coefficient on one of  the continuous 
variables (e.g., age) are not identified in a single-index model. Hence, they are normalized by setting them 
equal to their values in a probit model so that the results are comparable.  
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selectivity, estimates of uncorrected wage equation for women are also shown in Table 
3d.  Starting with the comparison between men and women, Tables 3b and 3c reveal that 
the coefficient on age/experience is larger for men than for women and that the gap 
decreases as we move up the distribution. Further, having a secondary educational 
attainment yields a higher return for women at the lower quantiles, as is also the case of 
working in the public sector or having a permanent contract. The coefficients on being 
married are larger for men, particularly at the lower quantiles. The most interesting 
finding, however, is that the estimated coefficients on tenure are higher for women than 
for men at the lower quantiles but converge to the same value as we move up in the 
distribution. Note that this pattern can be easily interpreted in terms of our proposed 
explanation based on statistical discrimination. In effect, employers perceive that the job 
attachment of L-type women is lower than men´s,   particularly at the early stage of their 
careers which, according to Table 2, is likely to be captured by the bottom of the wage 
distribution. Thus, the reward to longer tenure should be higher for them than for the 
“more stable” men.   
         Comparison of the results in Tables 3c and 3d allows us to check the effects of 
correcting for non-random selection in the sample of women.  The first effect to notice is 
that both  the constant term and the coefficients on several dummies in Table 3c fall 
relatively to those reported in Table 3d , implying an estimated average gap of 22.6% 
instead of the 19.7% obtained without correction. Furthermore, this reduction is much 
larger at the bottom of the distribution than at the top. Finally, the declining pattern of the 
estimated coefficient on tenure has a much more pronounced negative slope in the 
corrected equation than in the uncorrected one. Thus, overall, correcting for selectivity 
makes the floor phenomenon even more acute. This result rules out the alternative 
explanation of the floor pattern based on a pure selection phenomenon, whereby women 
with wages in the middle and upper parts of the distribution are a favourably selected 
sample in terms of characteristics. On the contrary, it supports that low-wage women are 
the favourably selected sample, exacerbating in this fashion the negative slope of the 
gender gap throughout the wage distribution. Moreover, the different patterns of the 
estimated coefficients on tenure by gender yield some support to our statistical 
discrimination hypothesis.   
                                   [Tables 3b, 3c and 3d about here] 
Summing up, the evidence presented so far points out that: (i) returns to observable 
characteristics differ by gender, (i) these differences change as we move throughout the 
distribution, and (iii) selectivity correction exacerbates the floor pattern. The next step is 
to investigate how important are unobservables in explaining the gender gap in order to 
check the consistency of our statistical discrimination hypothesis.  
4. Decomposition of the gender gaps 
4.1 Methodology (MM decomposition) 
     A generalization of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to a QR framework has been 
proposed by Machado and Mata (MM)’s (2005) using Monte Carlo methods. The 
decomposition is based on the construction of a counterfactual distribution of wf which 
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represents the distribution of female wages that would have prevailed if women had been 
endowed with their own characteristics but were paid like men.21 This counterfactual 
distribution is denoted )ˆ,/~( mff xwF θβ , where fw~  are generated values of wf and mθβˆ  are 
the (male) quantile regression coefficients. 
The steps in the MM algorithm in order to construct )ˆ,/~( mff xwF θβ  can be 
summarized as follows: 
? For each quantile θ=0.01, 0.02,.., 0.99, estimate the quantile regression vector of 
coefficients mθβˆ  using the male dataset. 
? Use the female dataset to generate fitted values, ´ˆ)(~ mfw θβθ = fx . For each θ, this 
generates Nf fitted values, where Nf is the size of the female sample. Next, 
randomly select s=100 of the elements of )(~ θfw for each θ and stack these into a 
99x100 element vector, fw~ . The empirical c.d.f. of these values is the estimated 
counterfactual distribution, namely what women would have earned if they were 
paid like men.   
? Then compare the counterfactual distribution with the empirical male and female 
wage distributions whose θth quantiles are defined by )(θmw  and θ(fw ), 
respectively. The gender gap at the θth quantile can be decomposed as: )(θmw -
=)(θfw [ )(θmw - )(~ θfw ]+[ )(~ θfw - )(θfw ]. The first term in brackets is the 
characteristics effect since it measures the contribution of different covariates to the 
gender gap at the θth quantile.  The second term in brackets is the returns effect 
since it captures the contribution of differences in returns to the gender gap at the 
θth quantile. 22 
     By randomly re-sampling the male data 250 times, using the bootstrap method by 
Parzen et al. (1994), bootstrapped standard errors for the contribution of these 
components have been obtained.  
     A similar decomposition procedure is applied to the wage residuals obtained after 
correcting for tenure in the QR. The idea behind this second counterfactual gap is to 
check whether the floor pattern becomes less intense when the effect of tenure is omitted. 
If the pattern becomes less steep, it must be that tenure is one of the main driving factors 
                                                 
21 Differences in observed characteristics are typically evaluated in the decomposition at the men´ s returns, 
under the assumption that they are not distorted by discriminatory behaviour.   
22 Notice that by implementing this decomposition, in contrast to Albrecht et al. (2003), we are evaluating 
the difference in characteristics at the market returns of men. By interchanging the role of men and women 
in the MM procedure, which is what these authors do, we can obtain the alternative evaluation at women´ s 
rewards, fθβ
)
, so that the Returns component is evaluated at the male dataset for each quantile. The results 
of this alternative decomposition are not presented here but the qualitative findings about the unexplained 
gap remain similar.   
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behind the floor phenomenon. By contrast, if it remains similar, tenure can not be an 
important explanation.  Additionally, in order to compare the role of tenure with that of 
temporary/permanent contracts, we perform a similar exercise, this time correcting for 
type of contract in the QR.  
4.2 Results of the MM decomposition 
 Table 4 presents the results of the MM decomposition with all covariates, while Figure 3 
depicts the raw and the three generated counterfactual gaps (solid line with all covariates 
and two dashed lines with wage residuals). Although implementing this decomposition 
with the selectivity corrected wage equations only adds slight additional computational 
burden to the MM procedure (since the single-index estimation only has to be done once; 
see Albrecht et al, 2005), we  only report results just for the uncorrected equations. We do 
so for two reasons. First, as discussed in section 3, because the floor pattern persists after 
controlling for selection. And, secondly, because one could argue that the selection 
correction part of the MM decomposition is not really necessary, since the estimated 
counterfactual distribution uses men ´s quantile regression coefficients and these are 
likely not biased by selection,  
As can be observed, the counterfactual gap is clearly decreasing along the distribution, 
reaching a minimum of about 50% at the 75th quantile, in accord with the floor 
phenomenon. That is, while the raw gap is basically explained by differences in returns at 
the bottom of the distribution, differences in observed characteristics explain about one-
half of the gap at the top of the distribution. Interestingly, the counterfactual gap with the 
wage residuals after correcting only for tenure is much flatter. By contrast, the 
counterfactual gap correcting only for type of contract looks fairly similar to the one 
obtained with all covariates. Thus, in accord with our proposed explanation, statistical 
discrimination seems to be an important factor in driving the large gap at the bottom of 
the distribution for which we provide further support in the next section using an 
alternative econometric approach.   
 [Table 4 and Figure 3 about here]  
5. Testing the statistical discrimination hypothesis with panel data 
       In the previous sections we have used QR to argue that statistical discrimination 
provides a plausible explanation for the floor pattern in the L-group under the assumption 
that age and tenure jointly increase as we move up the wage distribution holds. The 
evidence provided in Table 2 supports this interpretation. However, our conjecture could 
be greatly reinforced if we were to follow individuals in their jobs over time.     
     Fortunately, this can be done by exploiting the panel dimension of the ECHP in its 
eight available waves (1994-2001). Panel data estimation (in particular, fixed effects 
estimation) of similar wage equations to the ones estimated above - this time in real 
terms- can be used to test the significance and sign of the interaction of tenure and gender 
(female dummy) in each educational group, and for young and older workers, 
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respectively. Since fixed-effects estimation removes all individual unobserved 
heterogeneity which does not change over time, it allows us to analyze in a more direct 
way the effect of longer tenure on wages of workers with different educational 
attainments.    
     Given that our statistical discrimination hypothesis for the floor pattern, we should 
observe greater early-career returns to tenure for L-type women relative to L-type men. 
These differences, however, should not apply to the H-type group where both men´ s and 
women ´s participation rates are high. Our empirical strategy relies upon separate and 
pooled estimation of men´ s and women´ s wage equations. In the pooled estimation, all 
explanatory variables are interacted with a female dummy. Then, the coefficient on the 
interaction term Tenure* Female for the L-group should be positive and statistically 
significant whereas it should not be significant for the H-group. Moreover, the return to 
an extra year of tenure of a L-type woman is bound to increase much more when they are 
young than when they are older since young women are more likely to be involved in 
child-rearing tasks which raise their probability of quitting.  Thus, as a further robustness 
check to our results, we also carry out the fixed-effects estimation splitting the sample of 
workers into two age groups: below 36 and above 40 years of age at the first wave23. We 
should expect a much larger coefficient on the previous interaction term for the former 
age group than for the latter.  Finally, to control for selectivity biases in the sample of L-
type workers, we implement a two-step Heckman-correction procedure whereby a first-
stage participation probit (not reported) is estimated separately for men and women using 
similar identifying covariates to those discussed in Table 3c.  
      Table 5a presents the descriptive statistics regarding (log) wages, age and tenure of 
the overall sample. Only workers that are observed working at least twice are considered 
in order to estimate the effect of changes in tenure on wages. The final sample consists of 
an unbalanced panel that contains 21657 observations, out of which 11678 belong to the 
L-group and 17535 to the group below 36 years of age as of 1994.  For the group of 
young workers (first panel of Table 5a), we can observe that the average gender  gap is 
higher in the L-group than in the H-group (0.17 versus 0.07),  age is around 0.5 years 
higher for men than for women in both groups, and the difference in tenure is larger for 
L-type workers (on average, men have  around 0.5 years longer tenure than women) than 
for H-type workers (on average, men have around 0.33 years longer tenure than their 
female counterparts). 
     The results from the fixed-effects estimation of the wage equations for younger and 
older workers are reported in Tables 5b and 5c, respectively. For each age group and for 
each educational level we present separate estimations by gender plus a pooled estimation 
where all explanatory variables are interacted with a female dummy.  We report the 
                                                 
23 Small changes in the age boundaries of each of the groups do not make a significant difference in the 
results.  
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effects of age (and its square) and tenure (and its square) for men and for women 
separately and their interactions with a female dummy in the pooled estimation. 24 As 
shown in Table 5b, the returns to age are lower for women than for men in both 
educational groups.  Regarding tenure, however, we can observe- both from the separate 
gender wage regressions and from the pooled estimation of men and women- that the 
returns to tenure for the L-type women are significantly higher than for men. The 
estimated coefficients on the linear Tenure*female term and its square are highly 
significant and the differential effect is concave. On the contrary, the corresponding 
estimated coefficients in the H-group are non significant. Thus, both sets of results 
heavily support the role of statistical discrimination in explaining the floor phenomenon. 
This is further confirmed by the results in Table 5c for older workers where the 
differential gender effect on the returns to tenure in either educational group is 
statistically insignificant.  
     To evaluate the differential effect on tenure between the younger women and men in 
the L group, we can use the estimated coefficients on the interaction term Tenure*Female 
and its square in the penultimate column of Table 5b. At an average tenure of around 3.2 
years (see Table 5a), the difference is 3.46 percentage points per year, quite a significant 
gap. More importantly, the cumulative effect of the difference in tenure and tenure-
squared coefficients is maximized at 9 years, at which point this cumulative difference 
amounts at 8.1 percentage points.   
     Finally, another result worth mentioning is that the probability of working exerts a 
positive effect on wages only for the young L-type women, meaning that these women 
that we observe working (at least twice) are not a random sample of the population of all 
L-type women. Rather, they have higher wages than average. Thus, as pointed out in the 
QR analysis, this means that the floor pattern would be even stronger if our sample of 
women were a random sample of the female population. Notice as well that, to the extent 
that unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be time invariant, fixed-effects estimation 
weakens alternative explanations of the floor pattern based on heterogeneity affecting 
women (relatively to men) in a disproportionate way.   
[Tables 5a,5b and 5c about here]      
                                                 
24 Age replaces potential experience as a control because the age at which the individual started the first job 
does not change over time.  
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6. Conclusions and policy implications 
     In this paper, we have analyzed the evolution of gender gaps along the wage 
distribution in Spain both using QR and panel data approaches. Our main finding is that 
behind an irregular evolution of the gap for the whole sample of individuals, there is 
distinctive difference between the patterns of the gaps when distinguishing by high and 
low educational attainments. While for the H-group the gender gap is increasing over the 
distribution (glass ceiling), as in many other countries, it is strongly decreasing for the L-
group (floor pattern). In particular, this last pattern -not documented before- contrasts 
with those found in central and northern European countries, where the gap increases as 
we move up the distribution irrespectively of educational attainments. Moreover, we 
present descriptive evidence arguing that a similar pattern also holds in other southern 
European countries, like Greece or Italy, where female labour market participation of L-
type women is still rather low.   
We argue that non-random selection can not account for the novel floor 
phenomenon. Instead we favour an alternative explanation based on statistical 
discrimination in the presence of training costs co-financed by employers and workers. 
Due to the historical low participation of women in the L-group, employers may use 
statistical discrimination to lower their wages vis-à-vis more stable men in the lower part 
of the wage distribution since they expect future career interruptions to jeopardize their 
financing of specific training. However, as their job tenure expands the reasons behind 
statistical discrimination vanish, so that their wages converge to men’s wages with the 
same characteristics. This statistical discrimination hypothesis is further reinforced when 
we exploit the panel dimension of the ECHP, following the gender gaps as women stay 
longer in the same firms.  
The policy implications stemming from the existence of floors could be far 
reaching. For example, one could think that they give rise to a multiple equilibrium 
model of gender gaps in wages and participation rates. If cultural beliefs or reduced social 
expenditure on family aid lead to low L-type female participation, our explanation 
predicts that this initial situation will increase the wage gap in favour of men which, in 
turn, will exacerbate lower female participation. Hence, both effects lead to a “bad” 
equilibrium with low participation and large gaps. On the contrary, if societal 
discrimination is absent or family aid is generous, high female participation will lead to 
lower wage gaps which will further feed back into larger female participation driving the 
economy to a “good” equilibrium. This last situation seems to correspond to the Nordic 
countries while the former applies to some of the above-mentioned southern 
Mediterranean countries. In these circumstances, public policies in favour of reconciling 
family and work could move an economy from the “bad” to the “good” equilibrium not 
only, as is conventionally thought, by increasing female participation but, as stressed in 
this paper, by reducing the gender wage gap as well. Further analysis of these policy 
implications when participation is endogenously determined is part of our current 
research agenda (see, de la Rica et al., 2006). 
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Appendix 
A.1: Definition of variables 
The variables are drawn from the 1999 (6th wave) of the ECHP. Our group of interest is composed by wage 
earners working full-time (at least 1560 hours in a year or 30 hours per week on average). In this section we 
provide a more detailed description of the variables used in the analysis.  
Gross hourly wage: The ECHP collects data on average monthly labor income (gross and net), from 
salaried workers. Labor income includes salary bonus (divided by working months), and overtime. When a 
worker has more than one job, only the main job income is considered. Weekly hours in the main job are 
available, including overtime hours. We have set an upper bound of 60 hours to this variable in order to 
minimize the self-declared bias. This correction affects 2% of men and 0.9% of women from our total 
sample. Then, gross hourly wage is the monthly gross salary divided by 52/12 and multiplied by the weekly 
hours worked in the main job. 
Experience: defined as current age minus age at which the individual started working. 
Exp*Children: interaction between experience and a binary variable that takes a value of 1 when an 
individual has dependent children (from 0 to 16 years). In the participation equation in Table 3a, we 
considered separately the cases in which children are between 0 and 11 years (Exp*Children 0-11) or 
between 12 and 16 years (Exp*Children 12-16), but only the first one showed up significant.  
Secondary education: dummy for having completed upper secondary education. 
Individual characteristics: dummies for marital status, immigrant condition, district of residence and 
district size. 
Type of contract: temporary or permanent. 
Sector: private or public. 
Supervisory role: directive or managing position, supervisor of at least another employee and without 
responsibility for the rest of employees. 
Tenure:  obtained as the difference between the year of the survey, 1999, and the year of the start of the 
current job.  
Firm size: from 1 to 4 employees, from 5 to 19 employees, from 20 to 49 employees, from 50 to 99 
employees, from 100 to 499 employees and above 500 employees. 
Occupation: fifteen occupational groups have been considered, corresponding to an intermediate level of 
aggregation of the ISCO-88 (COM) classification. The list is: Legislators, senior officials and managers 
(OC1); Physical, mathematical, engineering, life science and health professionals (OC2); Teaching 
professionals (OC3); Other professionals (OC4); Physical, mathematical, engineering, life science and 
health associate professionals (OC5); Teaching and other associate professionals (OC6); Clerks (OC7), 
Models, salespersons and demonstrators (OC8); Personal and protective services workers (OC9); Skilled 
agricultural and fishery workers (OC10); Extraction and building trades workers, other craft and related 
trades workers (OC11); Metal, machinery, precision, handicraft printing and related trades workers (OC12); 
Plant and machinery operators and assemblers (OC13); Sales and services elementary occupations (OC14); 
and Agricultural, fishery and related laborers, laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 
(OC15).          
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                       Table A1: Labour activity rates by educational attainment (2002) 
Countries Men Women 
 Less than 
secondary 
Secondary Tertiary Less than 
secondary 
Secondary Tertiary 
Denmark 75.4 87.3 92.7 55.8 80.7 88.4 
Sweden 78.0 87.9 90.4 65.1 83.4 88.1 
U.K. 65.9 88.1 92.2 50.7 76.4 87.3 
Greece 81.0 88.5 89.7 42.1 57.2 82.4 
Italy 75.5 86.1 90.9 34.8 67.9 82.7 
Spain 83.5 90.1 91.9 42.3 67.6 83.1 
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, 2002 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Low-educated workers. Spain (1999) 
 M Working F Non-working F 
 Average St. dev Average St. dev Average St. dev
N. obs. 1585 726 998 
Age 37.89 11.31 36.19 11.33 38.81 8.39
Children 0-11 0.30 0.46 0.21 0.41 0.53 0.50
Children 12-16 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.38 0.25 0.43
Age Groups   
17 to 24 0.13 0.33 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.35
25 to 34 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.38 0.49
35 to 44 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.43 0.50
≥ 45 0.31 0.46 0.27 0.45 0.05 0.21
Married 0.68 0.47 0.53 0.50 0.73 0.44
Immigrant 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.09
Secondary ed. 0.29 0.46 0.38 0.49 0.24 0.43
Weekly hours 42.64 6.19 40.36 5.74  
Gross Hourly wage 1037 487 851 484  
Log  (wage) 6.86 0.41 6.63 0.47  
Experience 20.77 12.41 16.78 11.85  
Tenure 8.28 7.87 6.48 7.23  
Occupation   
OC1 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.11  
OC2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
OC3 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04  
OC4 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07  
OC5 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14  
OC6 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.24  
OC7 0.07 0.25 0.18 0.38  
OC8 0.08 0.28 0.18 0.38  
OC9 0.04 0.20 0.13 0.33  
OC10 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.10  
OC11 0.22 0.42 0.08 0.27  
OC12 0.10 0.30 0.01 0.10  
OC13 0.20 0.40 0.06 0.24  
OC14 0.05 0.21 0.20 0.40  
OC15 0.13 0.33 0.06 0.24  
Firm Size   
1-4 employees 0.18 0.38 0.22 0.42  
5-19 employees 0.31 0.46 0.25 0.44  
20-49 employees 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37  
50-99 employees 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31  
100-499 employees 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35  
> 500 employees 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.32  
Public sector 0.13 0.34 0.18 0.38  
Supervisory role   
Directive 0.05 0.23 0.03 0.16  
Supervisor 0.16 0.36 0.08 0.28  
Without responsibility 0.79 0.41 0.89 0.31  
Permanent contract 0.64 0.48 0.60 0.49  
Parents 65-75 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22
Parents >76 0.02 0.15 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.17
Non-labour income 23944 65727 28065 193603 31534 68140
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Table 2  
Experience, Tenure and Temporariness throughout the Wage Distribution  
(L-group, Spain, 1999) 
 Average θ=10 θ=25 θ=50 θ=75 θ=90 
       
MEN (L)       
Experience 20.8 5.2 11.3 20.2 31.1 38.2 
Tenure 8.3 0.5 1.2 3.4 15.0 20.3 
% Temp. contracts 36.0 43.5 39.3 35.4 32.3 30.4 
       
WOMEN (L)        
Experience 16.9 2.2 7.2 15.3 26.2 34.3 
Tenure 6.5 0.2 0.8 3.0 11.2 19.8 
% Temp. contracts 40.0 45.2 40.1 36.3 33.1 30.9 
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Table 3a:  
Estimates of the probability of working  
L-group. Spain. 1999 
 
WOMEN Probit Single-
index 
   
Constant -0.334*** -0.334 
 (0.004) (.)† 
Age -0.045*** -0.045 
 (0.002) (.)† 
No. of children -0.053*** -0.060** 
 (0.016) (0.024) 
Children 0-11 -0.085*** -0.078*** 
 (0.024) (0.031) 
Parents >65 0.074** 0.098** 
 (0.035) (0.048) 
Secondary 0.067*** 0.074*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) 
Married -0.092*** -0.083*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) 
Immigrant 0.034** 0.045** 
 (0.016) (0.021) 
Non-lab.income/100 -0.056*** -0.046*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) 
No. obs. 1,724 1,724 
   
  
                               Note:† The constant and age coefficients are normalized. 
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Table 3b. OLS and QR 
L-group. Spain. 1999 
Dependent variable : Ln. gross hourly wage 
MEN Average θ=10 θ=25 θ=50 θ=75 θ=90 
       
       
Constant 1.385*** 1.157*** 1.295*** 1.379*** 1.459*** 1.557*** 
 (0.047) (0.062) (0.063) (0.058) (0.064) (0.069) 
Experience 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.008* 0.008 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Experience2 -0.0002*** -0.0003** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.00005) (0.0001) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00009) (0.0001) 
Exp*Children -0.002** -0.003* -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.0008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.001) 
Secondary ed. 0.060*** 0.081** 0.060** 0.055*** 0.025 0.023 
 (0.020) (0.040) (0.027) (0.019) (0.024) (0.035) 
Immigrant -0.143 -0.192 -0.222 -0.244 0.005 0.151 
 (0.144) (0.130) (0.150) (0.165) (0.270) (0.265) 
Public sector 0.020 0.006 0.033 0.032 0.036 0.054 
 (0.030) (0.049) (0.038) (0.027) (0.040) (0.047) 
Permanent contract 0.065*** 0.105** 0.061** 0.028 0.037 0.073** 
 (0.022) (0.048) (0.030) (0.026) (0.027) (0.037) 
Supervisory role       
Directive 0.161*** 0.193*** 0.113** 0.166*** 0.135** 0.104* 
 (0.040) (0.073) (0.051) (0.050) (0.068) (0.059) 
Supervisor 0.089*** 0.083** 0.080*** 0.096*** 0.092*** 0.074** 
 (0.023) (0.035) (0.028) (0.031) (0.032) (0.035) 
Tenure 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.012** 0.009* 0.010* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Married 0.079*** 0.123*** 0.083*** 0.070*** 0.073** 0.077** 
 (0.021) (0.038) (0.025) (0.027) (0.030) (0.033) 
Nº Obs. 1585 1585 1585 1585 1585 1585 
R2 0.303 0.237 0.250 0.282 0.327 0.350 
       
Note: ***, **, * represent significance at 99, 95 and 90% respectively. Standard deviation in 
parentheses. Dummy variables for region, firm and local council size and occupations are also 
included. Omitted group: wage earners in private sector in less-than-5-employees firms,  without 
supervisory role, single, with primary education and in non-qualified jobs in services and 
commerce (OC14) 
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Table 3c. OLS and QR  
(with correction for selectivity) 
L-group. Spain. 1999 
Dependent variable : Ln. gross hourly wage 
WOMEN Average θ=10 θ=25 θ=50 θ=75 θ=90 
       
Constant 1.267*** 1.087*** 1.252*** 1.263*** 1.438*** 1.546*** 
 (0.0481) (0.076) (0.070) (0.073) (0.069) (0.069) 
Experience 0.006** 0.006 0.007 0.008* 0.009* 0.009* 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Experience2 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.00007) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Exp*Children -0.003*** 0.0007 -0.006*** -0.004* -0.003* -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Secondary ed. 0.104*** 0.096** 0.081** 0.051* 0.026 0.025 
 (0.033) (0.050) (0.039) (0.030) (0.039) (0.044) 
Immigrant -0.512*** -0.283** -0.387*** -0.556*** -0.597*** -0.606*** 
 (0.066) (0.137) (0.103) (0.131) (0.132) (0.142) 
Public sector 0.097*** 0.150** 0.134** 0.066** 0.067* 0.068* 
 (0.036) (0.073) (0.066) (0.031) (0.040) (0.042) 
Permanent contract 0.098*** 0.194*** 0.160*** 0.111** 0.092* 0.120** 
 (0.033) (0.062) (0.060) (0.048) (0.049) (0.051) 
Supervisory role       
Directive -0.041 -0.007 0.013 0.083 0.085 0.062 
 (0.108) (0.197) (0.129) (0.131) (0.179) (0.173) 
Supervisor 0.069* 0.075 0.073 0.086** 0.065 0.063 
 (0.041) (0.081) (0.061) (0.043) (0.061) (0.072) 
Tenure 0.024*** 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.013*** 0.009 0.011 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) 
Married 0.060** 0.064* 0.067* 0.093*** 0.022 0.086 
 (0.024) (0.040) (0.043) (0.032) (0.033) (0.044) 
Nº Obs. 726 726 726 726 726 726 
R2 0.3323 0.385 0.379 0.396 0.456 0.471 
Note: ***, **, * represent significance at 99, 95 and 90% respectively. Standard deviation in 
parentheses. Dummy variables for region, firm and local council size and occupations are also 
included. Omitted group: wage earners in private sector in less-than-5-employees firms,  without 
supervisory role,  single, with primary education and in non-qualified jobs in services and 
commerce (OC14) 
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Table 3d.  OLS and QR 
                                       (without correction for selectivity) 
L-group. Spain. 1999 
Dependent variable : Ln. gross hourly wage 
WOMEN Average θ=10 θ=25 θ=50 θ=75 θ=90 
       
Constant  1.308*** 1.118*** 1.295*** 1.313*** 1.447*** 1.555*** 
 (0.051) (0.082) (0.074) (0.078) (0.074) (0.073) 
Experience 0.007* -0.0001 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Experience2 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.00009) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Exp*Children -0.002 0.00004 -0.004** -0.003* 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Secondary ed. 0.113*** 0.103* 0.077* 0.059* 0.028** 0.027 
 (0.033) (0.059) (0.043) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040) 
Immigrant -0.479*** -0.249* -0.358*** -0.528*** -0.584*** -0.668*** 
 (0.073) (0.140) (0.112) (0.148) (0.144) (0.173) 
Public sector 0.108*** 0.150** 0.134** 0.066 0.067 0.066 
 (0.039) (0.073) (0.066) (0.051) (0.060) (0.072) 
Permanent contract 0.121*** 0.194*** 0.160*** 0.111** 0.090** 0.104** 
 (0.035) (0.062) (0.060) (0.048) (0.045) (0.048) 
Supervisory role       
Directive -0.050 0.018 0.017 -0.150 0.079 0.060 
 (0.129) (0.210) (0.138) (0.127) (0.184) (0.176) 
Supervisor 0.075* 0.081 0.094 0.096** 0.070 0.067 
 (0.045) (0.088) (0.061) (0.049) (0.066) (0.078) 
Tenure 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.013** 0.010 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) 
Married 0.065** 0.040 0.071* 0.093*** 0.022 0.086 
 (0.027) (0.050) (0.043) (0.032) (0.033) (0.044) 
Nº Obs. 726 726 726 726 726 726 
R2 0.308 0.372 0.372 0.385 0.421 0.462 
Note: ***, **, * represent significance at 99, 95 and 90% respectively. Standard deviation in 
parentheses. Dummy variables for region, firm and local council size and occupations are also 
included. Omitted group: wage earners in private sector in less-than-5-employees firms,  without 
supervisory role,  single, with primary education and in non-qualified jobs in services and 
commerce (OC14) 
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Table 4  
Counterfactual gender gaps 
L-group (Spain. 1999). 
 Mean θ=10 θ=25 θ=50 θ=75 θ=90 
Observed Gap 22.73 33.33 24.71 17.31 16.82 18.94 
Counterfactual gap 17.08 31.34 21.54 11.18 8.76 9.28 
 (1.32) (2.27) (1.61) (1.52) (1.56) (2.26) 
% 75.1 94.0 87.2 64.6 52.1 49.0 
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis.  The standard deviations have been 
obtained through 250 replications of the MM decomposition 
  
 
 
Table 5a: Means and St.Deviation of Log Real Wages, Age  and Tenure (in years) 
 Workers younger than 36  at first  wave 
(1994)  
 
Workers older than 40 at first 
 wave (1994)  
 Men Women Men Women 
 Low High  Low High  Low  High  Low  High 
         
 Log Wage 1.82 
(0.41) 
 
2.21 
(0.49) 
1.65 
(0.43) 
2.14 
(0.49) 
1.92 
(0.38) 
2.76 
(0.56) 
1.72 
(0.45) 
2.48 
(0.42) 
 Age 28.77 
(5.88) 
30.62 
(4.87) 
28.18 
(5.62) 
30.16 
(4.76) 
50.45 
(5.83) 
49.21 
(5.65) 
49.84 
(5.77) 
47.63 
(4.50) 
 Tenure 3.51 
(4.33) 
 
4.42 
(4.45) 
3.03 
(3.86) 
4.08 
(4.31) 
4.65 
(4.88) 
7.78 
(5.46) 
5.36 
(4.91) 
8.19 
(5.63) 
N. obs. 7933 2909 3805 2888 2266 438 1174 244 
  
Notes: Low: Highest educational level achieved is secondary education or less; High: Highest educational 
level achieved is tertiary education.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29
Table 5b: Log Real Wage Regressions – Workers younger than 36 at first wave (1994) 
Fixed Effects Estimation with Selection Correction 
 Men Women Pooled Men and 
Women 
 All Low High All Low High Low High 
Age 
 
0.173 
(0.008) 
0.169 
(0.009) 
0.185 
(0.024) 
0.134 
(0.011) 
0.139 
(0.014) 
0.127 
(0.022) 
0.169 
(0.009) 
0.186 
(0.023) 
Age2 
 
-0.002 
(0.0001) 
-0.002 
(0.0001) 
-0.002 
(0.0004) 
-0.001 
(0.0002 
-0.002 
(0.0002) 
-0.001 
(0.0004) 
-0.002 
(0.0001) 
-0.002 
(0.0003) 
Tenure 0.009 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.019 
(0.006) 
0.017 
(0.003) 
0.018 
(0.005) 
0.016 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.019 
(0.005) 
Tenure2 -0.0006 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-0.001 
(0.0004) 
-0.001 
(0.0002) 
-0.001 
(0.0003) 
-0.002 
(0.0004) 
-0.003 
(0.0002) 
-0.001 
(0.0004) 
Female*Age 
 
      -0.030 
(0.016) 
-0.058 
(0.033) 
Female*Age2 
 
      0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0009 
(0.0005) 
Female*Tenure --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.018 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
Female* 
Tenure2 
--- --- --- --- --- --- -0.001 
(0.0004) 
-0.0007 
(0.0006) 
Selection term -0.016 
(0.036) 
-0.077 
(0.051) 
0.032 
(0.094) 
0.164 
(0.050) 
0.439 
(0.197) 
-0.605 
(0.558) 
-0.077 
(0.050) 
0.032 
(0.091) 
Selection 
term* Female 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 0.516 
(0.312) 
-0.637 
(0.583) 
N.obs 10842 7933 2909 6693 3805 2888 11738 5797 
N. of groups 2513 2005 835 1689 1141 810 3146 1645 
  
Notes: All regressions also include 6 dummies for region, 2 dummies for industry and a dummy for work 
status (supervisor or not).  Occupational controls are dropped out because in almost all cases they do not 
show variations through time within individuals. In the last panel, when pooled men and women are taken 
together, all explanatory variables are interacted with female. 
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Table 5c: Log Real Wage Regressions – Workers older than 40 years at the  first wave (1994) 
Fixed Effects Estimation with Selection Correction 
 Men Women Pooled Men and 
Women 
 All Low High All Low High Low High 
Age 
 
0.016 
(0.021) 
0.005 
(0.024) 
0.065 
(0.057) 
0.035 
(0.031) 
0.031 
(0.036) 
0.040 
(0.097) 
0.005 
(0.024) 
0.066 
(0.053) 
Age2 
 
0.00008 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.00009 
(0.0008) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0005) 
Tenure 0.013 
(0.004) 
0.010 
(0.005) 
0.019 
(0.013) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
0.0007 
(0.007) 
-0.038 
(0.016) 
0.010 
(0.004) 
0.019 
(0.012) 
Tenure2 -0.0005 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.002 
(0.0006) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
0.001 
(0.0006) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.001 
(0.0006) 
Female*Age 
 
      0.026 
(0.044) 
-0.025 
(0.123) 
Female*Age2 
 
      -.0004 
(0.0004) 
0.0004 
(0.001) 
Female*Tenure --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.009 
(0.009) 
-0.057 
(0.021) 
Female* 
Tenure2 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.003 
(0.0009) 
Selection term 0.118 
(0.110) 
-0.026 
(0.164) 
-0.404 
(0.455) 
-0.055 
(0.225) 
-0.119 
(0.97) 
2.28 
(4.00) 
-0.026 
(0.163) 
-0.403 
(0.429) 
Selection 
term*Female 
--- ---     -0.092 
(0.995) 
2.69 
(4.55) 
N.obs 2704 2266 438 1414 1174 240 3440 678 
N. of groups 592 521 104 328 300 51 821 155 
  
Notes: All regressions also include 6 dummies for region, 14 dummies for occupation, 2 dummies for 
industry and a dummy for work status (supervisor or not). Workers with more than 15 years of tenure are 
not included since for them, the variable tenure is truncated at 15.  In the last panel, when pooled men and 
women are taken together, all explanatory variables are interacted with female. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 1a. Aggregate Gender Wage Gap
Spain 1999
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Figure 1b. Aggregate Gender Wage Gap
Sweden 1999
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Figure 1c. Gender Wage Gap by Education
H-group Spain 1999
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Figure 1d. Gender Wage Gap by Education
L-group Spain 1999
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Figure 2a. Gender Wage Gap by Education
Denmark 1999
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Quantiles
L
n
 
W
a
g
e
 
M
e
n
 
-
 
L
n
 
W
a
g
e
W
o
m
e
n
Wage gap low educated workers Wage gap highly educated workers
    
Figure 2b. Gender Wage Gap by Education
United Kingdom 1999
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Figure 2c:Gender Wage gap by education
Greece 1999
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Figure 2d. Gender Wage Gap by Education 
Italy 1999
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 Figure 3. Gender gap (Observed and Counterfactual). L-
group. Spain. 1999
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
10 25 50 75 90
Quantiles
Ln
W
ag
e
M
en
-
Ln
W
ag
e
W
o
Observed Counterfactual
Counterfactual-Ten Counterfactual-Perm
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
